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Abstract
Cybersecurity  is  of  capital  importance  in  a  world  where  economic  and social 
processes  increasingly  rely  on  digital  technology.  Although  the  primary  ethical 
motivation  of  cybersecurity  is  prevention  of  informational  or  physical  harm,  its 
enforcement can also entail conflicts with other moral values. This contribution provides 
an outline of value conflicts in cybersecurity based on a quantitative literature analysis 
and  qualitative  case  studies.  The  aim  is  to  demonstrate  that  the  security-privacy-
dichotomy—that still seems to dominate the ethics discourse based on our bibliometric 
analysis—is  insufficient  when  discussing  the  ethical  challenges  of  cybersecurity. 
Furthermore,  we want to sketch how the notion of contextual integrity could help to 
better understand and mitigate such value conflicts. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity, Moral Values, Value Conflicts, Privacy, Contextual Integrity
Introduction
The increasing use of information and communication technology (ICT) in all spheres of 
modern life makes the world a richer, more efficient and interactive place. However, it 
also increases its fragility as it reinforces our dependence on ICT systems that can never 
be completely safe or secure. For example, it is difficult to keep industries and support 
systems  functioning  when  there  is  a  significant  disruption  of  computer  controls  and 
monitors. Therefore, cybersecurity—the “collection of tools, policies, security concepts, 
security  safeguards,  guidelines,  risk  management  approaches,  actions,  training,  best 
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment, 
organization and user’s assets” (International Telecommunications Union, 2008, p. 3)—
has become a matter of global interest and importance. Already more than 60 nations 
have officially published some form of strategy document outlining their official stance 
on  cyberspace,  cyber-crime,  and/or  cybersecurity  (Klimburg,  2012;  see  also 
https://ccdcoe.org/strategies-policies.html  for  a  more  recent  estimate).  Given  that  the 
annual  cost  to  the  global  economy from cybercrime alone  is  more than  $400 billion 
(estimation  from  2014;  Center  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies,  2014),  the 
importance  of  cybersecurity  is  undisputed.  Accordingly,  one  can  observe  in  today’s 
cybersecurity discourse an almost constant emphasis on an ever-increasing and diverse 
set  of  threat  forms,  ranging  from  basic  computer  viruses  to  cybercrime  and 
cyberespionage activities, as well as cyber-terror and cyberwar (Dunn Caveltry, 2014).
This growing complexity of the digital ecosystem in combination with increasing global 
risks  has  created  the  following dilemma.  Overemphasizing  cybersecurity may violate 
fundamental  values  like  equality,  fairness,  freedom,  or  privacy.  On  the  other  hand, 
neglecting cybersecurity could undermine citizens’ trust  and confidence in the digital 
infrastructure as well as in policy makers and state authorities. In order to increase our 
understanding of this dilemma, this contribution aims to provide an overview on value 
conflicts  in  cybersecurity  based  on  a  systematic  review  on  the  ethical,  legal  and 
technological literature on cybersecurity. In particular, we want to outline that a focus on 
the opposition of cybersecurity vs. privacy is insufficient for understanding the ethical 
complexity  of  cybersecurity.  As  cybersecurity  affects  ICT  applications  in  all  social 
domains, an exhaustive review of all value conflicts is not the goal of this paper. Instead, 
we will discuss some specific examples that go beyond the security-privacy dichotomy. 
The contribution is structured as follows. First, we provide a bibliometric characterization 
of  the  cybersecurity  domain  since  1978  and  we  outline  how  major  themes  have 
developed with a focus on ethical topics. The bibliometric analysis is still ongoing, so we 
present a set of preliminary results. Second, we discuss in more detail specific examples 
of  value  conflicts.  Third,  based on the  examples,  we present  a  preliminary map that 
outlines  the  interrelation  of  (some of)  the  values  that  are  involved.  We also  make  a 
suggestion on how the framework of contextual integrity can help to mitigate possible 
value conflicts. Finally, in the conclusions, we discuss the relevance and limitations of the 
quantitative approach for creating a “value map” for cybersecurity and we outline the 
next step in our research endeavor.
Our paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of ethical issues in cyber-security. 
It emerges from a project funded by the European Commission (CANVAS—Constructing 
an AlliaNce for VAlue-sensitive cyberSecurity;  see www.canvas-project.eu). CANVAS 
integrates the different perspectives of technology developers,  legal and philosophical 
scholars as well as social scientists from the presupposition that technology development 
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in  cybersecurity should be value-driven;  i.e.,  should incorporate European values and 
fundamental rights.
A bibliometric characterization of cybersecurity
For  our  quantitative  study,  we identified  the  literature  body on  cybersecurity  in  two 
databases:  Web of Science Core Collection (WoS) and  Scopus.1 We used the following 
methodology for identifying search keywords: In a first step, relying on literature, on the 
“keyword”  function  of  Scopus (the  database  allows  extracting  keywords  used  in  a 
publication body by the authors of publications) and on the cybersecurity experts in the 
CANVAS consortium,2 we identified terms that  characterize either  general  aspects  of 
cybersecurity  or  specific  aspects.3 We also  looked for  terms  that  characterize  ethical 
topics (see below) and terms that characterize the whole body of literature dealing with 
information technology, computation etc. Latter set is needed to relate the growth of the 
literature in the cybersecurity domain to an estimate of the overall growth of scientific 
literature in the domain in which cybersecurity is embedded. Otherwise, an identified 
growth could just be an indication of an increase in general publication activity. This first 
step generated 21 keywords groups of up to 92 keywords per group.
In  a  second  step,  we  assessed  the  sensitivity  of  the  keywords,  i.e.  their  ability  to 
discriminate  as good as possible  publications  that  deal  with cybersecurity from other 
publications that deal with completely different topics. For doing this, for each group, we 
started  with  an  unambiguous  set  of  terms  that  likely  have  a  clear  reference  to 
cybersecurity (e.g. “cybersecurity or “data security”) and we checked how much each 
term contributes to the number of hits. Terms that had almost no impact on the number of 
hits  (i.e.  they contribute  less  than  0.1% of  the  detected  publications)  were  excluded. 
Then, to the remaining set, we added terms that we considered being more ambiguous 
and we checked which publications additionally joined the set. If more than 20% of the 
additional publications clearly had no relation to cybersecurity (or the sub-group under 
investigation)  based  on  a  check  of  the  title  for  the  first  50  hits,  the  keyword  was 
considered too unspecific. This was done sequentially for each keyword and for each 1 Web of Science Core Collection (WoS): https://apps.webofknowledge.com, the search was performed for 
the category “topics”, which searches in title, abstract, author keywords and so-called ‘keywords plus’ 
(added by WoS); Scopus: http://www.scopus.com, the search was performed for the category “title-abstract-
keywords”. Date of the search: 22-29/01/2017.2 The consortium consists of 11 academic and non-academic institutions as outlined on https://canvas-
project.eu/canvas/index.php/what-is-canvas/consortium-partners/3 We looked for keywords for the following specific aspects (only a selection of them is discussed in this  
contribution due to space restrictions): Authentication, Bots, Crime, Critical Infrastructure, Cryptography, 
Cyber  Conflict,  Distributed  Denial  of  Service,  Defense  (means),  Forensics,  Hacking,  Identity  Theft, 
Malware (general and specific), Phising, Spam, Surveillance. This is not a comprehensive list of all issues  
relevant to cybersecurity.  It  includes only topics where one can expect to some degree keywords with 
sufficient  specificity  (e.g.,  the  notion  of  “Integrity”—a  common  goal  within  cybersecurity—is  too 
unspecific for a search).
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aspect under consideration—latter has been done within the set of papers that contain 
cybersecurity keywords. In this way, the keyword sets CYBER4 and ICT5 were generated, 
as  well  as  keyword-sets  for  the  specific  aspects  (not  outlined  here  due  to  space 
restrictions; some examples are described below).
In a first step, we determined the annual growth of the general cybersecurity literature 
body estimated by CYBER relative to the literature body estimated by ICT. The search 
was  performed  end  of  January  2017  (to  ensure  that  the  year  2016  is  covered  as 
completely as possible). The result is shown in Figure 1. The basic trend is reproduced in 
both databases, namely a first peak in 1983, a substantial increase starting in the 1990s 
and  local  maxima  around  2005,  2009  and  2015.  The  databases  may  be  further 
complemented with papers published in 2016 in the next weeks (due to differences in the 
database curation processes), so the results for the last year should be taken with a grain 
of salt.  Overall,  the database  Scopus includes substantially more cybersecurity papers 
than WoS (266,343 vs. 78,446 papers). This is because Scopus includes more conference 
abstracts  and technical  journals  compared to  WoS.  Such differences  are  an important 
reason that  bibliometric  arguments  usually should rely on searches  in more than one 
database.
Figure 1: Growth of the cybersecurity literature relative to the publication activity in general ICT, 
estimated for the databases Scopus and Web of Science Core Collection (WoS).
In order to better characterize the overall cybersecurity literature body, we looked also to 
the subject categories to which the papers are attributed.6 Figure 2 shows the result of this 
analysis. We find that—compared to the overall ICT literature body—cybersecurity is 4 The  Boolean  search  expression  is:  botnet*  OR  "computer  crim*"  OR  "computer  security”  OR 
cryptography OR cyberattack OR "cyber attack" OR cyberconflict OR "cyber conflict" OR "cyber crim*" 
OR cyberdefense OR "cyber defense"  OR cybersecurity OR "cyber-security"  OR "cyber security"  OR 
cyberterrorism OR "cyber terrorism" OR cyberthread* OR "cyber threat*" OR cyberwar* OR "cyber war*" 
OR "data leak*" OR "data security" OR "denial of service" OR DDoS OR firewall OR "hardware security" 
OR "information security" OR "internet security" OR "IT security" OR malware OR "mobile security" OR 
"network  security"  OR "non-repudiation"  OR "security  breaches"  OR "security of  data"  OR "security 
requirement*"  OR  "security  software"  OR  "security  system*"  OR  "security  threat*"  OR  "security 
vulnerabilit*" OR sigint OR "system security" OR "voting system" OR "web security"5 The search term included all terms from the set CYBER and the Boolean expression: algorithm* OR 
"artificial intelligence" OR "big data" OR "communication system*" OR comput* OR cyber* OR "data 
mining"  OR  "data  processing"  OR  "database  system*"  OR  digital*  OR  "e-mail"  OR  hardware  OR 
"information and communication technolog*" OR "information management" OR "information processing" 
OR  "information  retrieval"  OR  "information  science"  OR  "information  system*"  OR  "information 
technology"  OR  "intelligent  system*"  OR  internet  OR  "machine  learning"  OR  "mobile  phone*"  OR 
"network protocol*" OR robot* OR "search engine*" OR "signal processing" OR smartphone OR "social 
media" OR "social networking" OR software OR telecommunication OR "virtual reality" OR website* OR 
"world wide web"6 The subject categories characterize the disciplinary background to which a journal is attributed in which  
a paper is published; a journal can be attributed to more than one subject category.
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more  strongly  discussed  in  computer  science  and  engineering;  in  particular,  the 
application domains “science” (which includes physics, chemistry, geosciences, etc.) and 
“life  sciences”  are  less  prominently  represented.  Interestingly,  the  relative  weight  of 
social sciences and humanities papers is even a bit larger in the CYBER literature body 
compared to the ICT body. Furthermore, in both databases, the majority of papers are 
conference proceedings papers (Scopus: 58%,  WoS: 56%), followed by journal articles 
(Scopus: 34%, WoS: 39%); the other categories are negligible.
Figure 2: Relative fraction of subject categories in the ICT and CYBER literature bodies estimated for the 
databases Scopus and Web of Science Core Collection (WoS).
We  now  present  the  result  for  a  selection  of  the  various  aspects  of  cybersecurity 
investigated  so  far.  We  estimated  the  fraction  of  literature  related  to  cryptography 
(CRYPTO7),  cyberwar  (WAR8),  hacking  (HACK9)  and  malware  (MAL10)  relative  to 
CYBER, starting in 1991 (due to the low number of papers before the 1990s). The results 
are displayed in Figure 3. As a general remark, we see that the relative weight of these 
aspects within the set CYBER is generally larger in WoS compared to Scopus; the exact 
reason for this is currently under investigation by us. Qualitatively, however, the trends 
are similar in both databases. The CRYPTO literature body covers a considerable fraction 
of CYBER, however its relative importance decreases in time. In contrast, WAR, HACK 
and MAL show an increase, but at different moments in time. The discourse on hacking 
starts growing substantially in the 1990s, the discourse on malware in the early 2000s and 
the discourse on cyberwar in the late 2000s. More subtle differences between the two 
databases are currently under investigation.  
7 Boolean expression: CYBER AND (certificate OR cryptanalysis OR cryptography OR decryption OR 
"digital signature" OR encryption OR "perfect forward secrecy" OR "public key infrastructure" OR "zero 
knowledge")8 Boolean  expression:  CYBER  AND  ("advanced  persistent  threats"  OR  "cyber  attack*"  OR  "cyber 
conflict*" OR "cyber defense" OR "cyber terrorism" OR "cyber threat*" OR "cyber war*" OR cyberattack* 
OR  cyberconflict*  OR cyberdefense  OR  cyberterrorism  OR cyberthread*  OR cyberwar*  OR  "digital 
sabotage" OR espionage OR "information warfare")9 Boolean expression: CYBER AND ("amplification attack*" OR "black hat" OR "bot detection" OR 
botmaster OR botnet* OR "bot herder" OR "command and control  server" OR "denial of service" OR 
DDoS OR fastflux OR hacker* OR hacking OR hacktivism OR "reflection attack*" OR spoofing OR 
"script kiddies" OR "white hat" OR "identity theft*" OR "identity hack" OR phisher* OR phishing  OR 
spam* OR vishing)10 Boolean expression: CYBER AND (adware OR backdoor OR "browser hijacker" OR "crypto-locker" 
OR "drive-by" OR dropper OR "exploit kit" OR keylogger OR malicious OR malspam OR malvertising 
OR malware* OR ransomware OR rootkit* OR scareware OR spyware OR trojan* OR virus* OR worm*)
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Figure 3: Growth of selected cybersecurity topics estimated for the databases Scopus and Web of Science 
Core Collection (WoS).
Finally,  we  present  the  results  for  a  selection  of  topics  related  to  the  ethics  of 
cybersecurity. Here, we only compare the temporal development of papers that include 
the terminology of privacy (PRIVAT11) compared to papers that include a selection of 
other value terms (VALUE12). Here, we see for the first time conflicting results when 
comparing  the  two  databases:  whereas  Scopus identifies  a  downward  trend  in  the 
PRIVAT literature body,  WoS identifies an upward trend. A first analysis indicates that 
this is not due to errors in the search procedure, but refers to differences between the two 
databases. We are currently investigating possible reasons for this conflicting result. The 
same holds for the peak in 2012 in WoS in the VALUE set, that is not present in Scopus. 
Overall, however, the set PRIVAT is still more than 4 (WoS) respectively more than 6 
(Scopus)  times larger  than VALUE, indicating that  the ethics  of  cybersecurity is  still 
dominated by the privacy debate. 
Figure 3: Growth of selected ethical aspects of cybersecurity estimated for the databases Scopus and Web 
of Science Core Collection (WoS).
In  summary,  the  results  provide  a  first  step  in  a  quantitative  description  of  the 
cybersecurity literature body. The relevance of these findings for the overall scope of this 
paper will be discussed in the conclusion.
Paradigmatic value conflicts in cybersecurity
It  is  undisputed  that  cybersecurity  has  an  ethical  legitimation,  because  cybersecurity 
problems have ethical consequences such as economic damage due to loss of data (e.g. 
stolen data,  a form of informational harm) but also physical harm (e.g.  when critical 
physical  systems  are  breached  like  the  electricity  grid).  Furthermore,  confidentiality 
breaches  can  violate  intellectual  property  rights  or  privacy  rights,  i.e.  lead  to 
informational harm (Brey, 2007). However, while most cybersecurity measures aim at 
preventing harm, they at the same time can cause harm and violate human rights; for 
instance, by limiting personal freedom in order to counter cyber threats. Furthermore, 
some specific aspects of cybersecurity raise difficult ethical questions. Examples include 
the ethics of cyberwar; prominent topics here are to determine what counts as an act of 
war in cyberspace,  how to deal with collateral  damage and to determine the possible 
consequences  of  cyber-attacks  (Rowe,  2008).  Other  scholars  focus  on  the  issue  of 
“ethical hacking”, thereby targeting the people who both instantiate the main threat for 
cybersecurity (by attacking vulnerable systems) and the main opportunity (by identifying 
weak spots in a system’s security like so-called “zero days”). For example, Pike argues 11 Boolean expression: CYBER AND (privacy OR "data protection")12 Boolean expression: CYBER AND (autonomy OR dignity OR equality OR fairness OR justice OR 
responsibility)
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that the teaching of ethical hacking (being trained in how to support the protection of 
systems by knowing their weaknesses) is important to deal with current challenges but 
that one should be careful with the destructive nature of some of the skills that are taught  
(Pike, 2013). Related to this problem are ethical consequences of the political economy 
of cybersecurity. For instance, it is argued that the large sums of money that are paid for 
finding zero days in software can be incentives for unethical behavior (Egelman, Herley, 
& van Oorschot, 2013).
In order to provide a more structured introduction into value conflicts in cybersecurity, 
we will investigate examples of four domains in which ethical issues of cybersecurity can 
arise: business, health, politics as domains of application of cybersecurity technology, and 
general issues related to the design of such technologies. 
Cybersecurity value conflicts in business:  The question of how businesses ought to 
deal with cybersecurity can be analysed from different normative perspectives. Let us 
have a brief look at four examples. In 1962 Milton Friedman famously claimed that in a 
free economy “(…) there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud” (Friedman, 1982, p. 133). In 1970 Friedman restated his idea in an 
influential New York Times article: The dominant obligation of managers, according to 
Friedman,  was  to  look  after  the  interests  of  their  companies’  shareholders  whilst 
complying with legal requirements (Friedman, 1970).
In  response  to  Friedman,  other  normative  ideas  were  developed,  stipulating  moral 
responsibilities for business going beyond his fairly minimal requirements. One approach 
focused on sustainability. In the late 1980s the World Commission on Environment and 
Development chaired  by  Gro  Harlem  Brundtland  advocated  the  idea  of  sustainable 
development defined as “(…) development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising  the  ability  of  future  generations  to  meet  their  own  needs”  (World 
Commission, 1987). In the 1990s John Elkington developed an adjusted conception of 
sustainability  for  the  business  sphere  taking  into  account  the  economic  and  social 
dimension  in  addition  to  the  environmental  one.  All  three  together  constitute  what 
Elkington calls the Triple Bottom Line (Elkington, 1997).
A second alternative approach towards the moral obligations of business centres on the 
idea  of  corporate  social  responsibility  (CSR).  Archie  Carrol  advanced  an  influential 
conception whereby CSR is understood as a pyramid having four layers: the bottom layer 
consists of economic responsibilities, the second layer involves legal requirements, the 
third ethical obligations, and the top layer includes a philanthropic component  (Carroll, 
1991).
Edward  Freeman  advocated  a  third  alternative:  stakeholder  theory.  He  defined  a 
stakeholder  as  a  “(…)  group  or  individual  who  can  affect  or  is  affected  by  the 
achievement of the firm's objectives”  (Freeman, 1984, p. 25). For stakeholder theorists 
the  idea  that  business  has  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders  with  certain  interests  and 
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entitlements that have to be taken seriously does not only make business sense; it is an 
ethical requirement as well. 
Without going into any thorough normative analysis, we will point out some important 
examples of ethical considerations based on the above-mentioned four approaches. From 
Friedman’s minimalist  point of view, business has an obligation to avoid breaches of 
cybersecurity  as  they  can  easily  cause  a  drop  in  share  value  thus  harming  the 
shareholders. On the other hand, it is important not to invest a disproportional amount of 
time and money in cybersecurity, because excessive costs for mitigating cybersecurity 
risks  would negatively affect  profitability and thus,  again,  the  shareholders’ interests. 
Since corporations’ main moral obligations concern their shareholders it is important to 
come up with the most efficient methods to reduce the most probable cyber risks.
The idea of the Triple Bottom Line introduces additional normative considerations.  Let 
us exclusively concentrate on economic sustainability broadly understood, i.e. the long-
term survival and maintenance of the context in which business flourishes. If we accept 
that  corporations  should  contribute  to  economic  sustainability  thus  understood,  this 
would imply more stringent obligations to stress cybersecurity even for those companies 
that have no particularly enhanced short-term risk profile (because they do not deal with 
sensitive data or critical infrastructure, for example). We could make the argument that 
they should nevertheless contribute to herd immunity thus lowering long-term cyber risks 
for the economic infrastructure as a whole. Thus, a long-term systemic and collectivist 
risk management approach emerges instead of the individualized and short-term approach 
associated with Friedman’s perspective.
Carroll’s CSR model introduces ethical responsibilities “to do what is right” (p. 42) and 
“to avoid harm” (p. 42) over and above exclusively economic and legal responsibilities 
(that had arguably already been stipulated by Friedman, albeit  in a somewhat diluted 
fashion).  This  opens  up  pathways  for  yet  other  arguments.  Consistent  with  Carroll’s 
ethical responsibilities, for example, it could be argued that even if cyber threats would 
not pose any economic risk and absent any legal requirements (e.g. a strong monopoly in 
a low regulation developing country), it would still be imperative to rigorously protect 
sensitive customer data to avoid information related harm. 
From a stakeholder theory perspective, finally, a complex web of ethical considerations 
materializes. On the one hand, customer protection demands strong cybersecurity.  Yet 
this  should  not  lead  to  disproportional  security  measures  reducing  the  freedom and 
autonomy of  employees  in  an  effort  to  identify  ‘malicious  insiders’ and  exclude  all 
internal  threats  to  cybersecurity.  Both  customers  and  employees  are  important 
stakeholder  whose  rights  and interests  ought  to  be taken into  account.  Similar  value 
conflicts arise when looking at reporting security breaches and data leaks. Whilst public 
notification might harm shareholders in the short term, it might benefit society in the 
longer  term.  Again  both  the  shareholders  and  the  community  at  large  are  legitimate 
stakeholders that both ought to be considered. As cybersecurity challenges for business 
are likely to increase for the foreseeable future, it is imperative to thoroughly analyse the 
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relevant normative considerations in order to strike a good balance between competing 
values. 
 
Cybersecurity value conflicts in health: Conflicts with regard to cybersecurity in health 
are  often  related  to  privacy  and  data  protection,  i.e.  securing  health  data  against 
unauthorized access. However, there are other types of conflicts. For instance, reaching a 
high level of cybersecurity might be very costly and therefore, only a small amount of 
people might be able to afford strong cybersecurity. Cybersecurity also might contradict 
usability and accessibility. 
These  problems  can  be  demonstrated  with  the  paradigmatic  example  of  the  German 
eHealth  Card  (eHC):  “As  part  of  the  German  health-care  reform,  the  current  health 
insurance card  is  being upgraded to an electronic health  card.  On it,  data  on patient 
investigations, drug regulations, vaccinations and emergency data are stored. The aim is 
among other things to improve medical care and the prevention of drug incompatibilities 
and duplication of investigations” (Jürjens & Rumm, 2008). Initially, it was planned to 
disseminate  the  eHC  to  every  person  insured  through  the  German  health  insurance 
system. However, due to strong opposition from various stakeholders, only at least 10 per 
cent of insured person should receive an eHC (Fox, 2010). Furthermore, due to security 
considerations concerning data protection some of the functions (electronic prescription 
and electronic health record; the latter can be used on a voluntary basis) of the eHC were 
not realized. Particularly German physicians are quite skeptical with regard to the eHC, 
since it is feared that its deployment will cause huge costs and will increase the workload 
of physicians and health care personnel. At the same time, the benefits, e.g. in terms of 
security,  are  less clear:  “The efficiency of the system is  considered as critical  by the 
physicians,  particularly  in  terms  of  data  security  and  potential  misuse  of  data.  The 
primary concern of the physicians is the unauthorized access of a third party to stored 
data.” In addition, “[r]egarding the introduction of the eHC to date, most physicians have 
criticized the very opaque communication and poor instruction on the subject” (Wirtz, 
Mory, & Ullrich, 2012). From the point of view of at least some stakeholders, it seems 
not to be satisfactory to only claim, for instance by state authorities, that cybersecurity 
and  efficiency  can  be  increased—more  information  is  requested.  Given  the  existing 
literature regarding security issues of the German eHC, many of the concerns that were 
mentioned  by physicians  seem to  be  correct  (Sunyaev,  Leimeister,  & Krcmar,  2010; 
Winandy, 2010).
The deployment of the German eHC and similar ICT infrastructures in other countries 
might also be accompanied with potential discrimination. Due to security considerations, 
e.g. to protect medical data against misuse and unauthorized access, such infrastructures 
employ encryption and password protection of sensitive data.  Laur mentions “[w]hile 
some people have already difficulty remembering a PIN (especially elderly and disabled 
people), having many more passwords that are intended to protect them could put them at 
risk of disclosure, loss or stealing” (Laur, 2015). Although Laur refers to electronic health 
records in general, the problem also applies to the German eHC in particular. The security 
measures employed in the case of the eHC are not designed in a way the idea of universal 
design  and general  accessibility  is  demanding.  This  raises  questions  regarding  social 
justice and equality. It is quite likely that the affected stakeholders will create their own 
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work-arounds, for example by writing passwords or PINs on the eHC or by disclosing 
them to health care personnel, which certainly will reduce their level of data protection, 
privacy and security with regard to their medical record. In other words, cybersecurity 
measures that shall protect medical information of citizens but are ill constructed from a 
usability point of view, force at least some parts of the population to act in a way that  
reduces their security.
To sum up, at least the example of the German electronic health card and probably other 
instances of such cards or electronic health records show that cybersecurity can be in 
conflict with other values than privacy. In the above-mentioned cases, we see conflicts 
with regard to usability and accessibility, social justice and equality. Moreover, increasing 
cybersecurity  almost  always  causes  economic  burdens  which  might  not  be  fairly 
distributed. 
Cybersecurity  value  conflicts  in  national  security: Value  conflicts  with  respect  to 
cyber security in the political domain are regularly phrased in terms of security versus 
privacy, but at closer inspection they are often more complicated. Take for example the 
discussion about end-to-end encryption in WhatsApp. Governments and security agencies 
have  argued  that  they  need  to  be  able  to  access  such  encrypted  communication  for 
security reasons, e.g. to be able to early detect possible terrorist attacks. Opponents of 
such  access  by  governments  and  security  agencies  do  not  only  point  at  privacy 
considerations, but also at the fact that encrypted communication that cannot be accessed 
by governments and their agencies might be important for the democratic process, and 
that  it  enables  opposition  movements  in  countries  with  totalitarian  or  suppressive 
regimes. 
A similar issue has arisen in relation to the Tor network. “Tor is free software and an open 
network that helps … defend against traffic analysis, a form of network surveillance that 
threatens  personal  freedom  and  privacy.”13 The  networks  operates  as  “a  group  of 
volunteer-operated servers that allows people to improve their privacy and security on the 
Internet.”14 In  the  aftermath  of  the  hacking  of  the  Democratic  Party  during  the  US 
elections, it  turned out that a Dutch private  Tor server had probably been used in the 
hacking.15 The  Tor  server  was  owned  by  Rejo  Zenger,  A Dutch  Bits  of  Freedom 
employee.  Bits  of  Freedom describes  itself  as  “the  leading  Dutch  digital  rights 
organization,  focusing  on privacy and communications  freedom in  the  digital  age”.16 
While Zenger recognized that  Tor servers can be misused by hackers, and are in that 
sense a threat to cybersecurity, he believes that this is a price worth paying, not only for 
reasons of privacy but also because these servers may be crucial for whistle blowers to 13 See: https://www.torproject.org/ - Accessed 28/01/2017.14 See: https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en - Accessed 28/01/2017.15 See:  http://nos.nl/artikel/2151234-tor-helpt-hackers-maar-ook-klokkenluider-stoppen-heeft-geen-
zin.html - Accessed 28/01/2017.16 https://www.bof.nl/home/english-bits-of-freedom/ - Accessed 29/01/2017.
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reveal abuses. Again, the value that is at stake here is not just privacy but also a range of 
civil liberties that are seen as crucial for democracy and the democratic process.
Another example is profiling. In this case, values like non-discrimination and absence of 
bias are at  stake and are potentially conflicting with security.  In profiling,  people are 
approached, judged or treated in a certain way because these have characteristics that fit a 
certain profile and that are associated with certain other traits (i.e. traits other than by 
which they are identified as belonging to the profile). Profiling is used for a wide range of 
purposes. It may be used by the police or security agencies to find criminals or terrorists; 
by airports  to  decide  who to  check more carefully,  by (internet)  companies  to  target 
certain  consumers,  by  banks  in  deciding  who  to  give  a  loan  (and  against  what 
percentage).  As  these  examples  already  suggest  sometimes  profiling  serves  security 
objectives.  At  the  same time,  profiling  may inflict  all  kinds  of  undeserved  harm on 
people, from nuisance to false accusations to even, in extreme cases, imprisonment of 
innocent people.  Although profiling may involve privacy violations,  because personal 
information is  gathered to fit  somebody into a profile,  the main issue at  stake is  not 
privacy. Rather the issue is that a generalization is made based on limited information 
about a person. This generalization is based on statistical information about a group to 
which a person belongs while, due to its probabilistic nature, this information may say 
nothing  about  that  particular  person.  Profiling  may  lead  to  stereotyping  and 
discrimination. For example, the use of facial recognition technologies by the police and 
security officers has led to such concerns. Some studies suggest that facial recognition 
cognition algorithms are less accurate for certain social groups or races (Klare, Burge, 
Klontz, Vorder Bruegge, & Jain, 2012), which may lead to racial bias in their use (Garvie, 
Bedoya, & Frankle, 2016; Introna & Wood, 2004).
Another value issue that might arise due to the collection of data by certain organizations 
for  security reasons and that  is  not  completely covered by privacy is  the creation of 
power imbalances. Economic monopolies or oligarchies are often considered undesirable, 
and  in  democracies,  balancing  the  (political)  power  between  citizens  and  their 
government  is  an important  concern.  Maintaining certain power balances is  therefore 
considered important by many for a healthy economy and for democratic politics. What 
seems to be less recognized is that in the information age, the possession of information 
about others and their behavior is increasingly a source of power. This also means that 
organizations  that  collect  or  possess  large  amounts  of  (personal)  data  may  have 
increasingly power over other actors, which may lead to the disruption of existing power 
balances  and  the  creation  of  new power  imbalances.  This  applies  to  companies  like 
Google or  Facebook that collect large amounts of data about users and consumers, but 
also to governments and security agencies that may collect large amounts of data about 
citizens—and to providers of cybersecurity technologies as well, as they activities may 
involve the access to highly sensitive data. It should be noted that the accumulation of 
large amounts of data in the hands of a few may lead to new power imbalances and may 
be problematic even if such data is anonymized, or if people have given their informed 
consent for the collection, storage and use of their data. This means that even if privacy 
concerns are properly addressed, the accumulation of large amounts of data in the hands 
of a few may be considered problematic for economic as well as political reasons. 
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Value  conflicts  in  cybersecurity  design  processes:  Cybersecurity  field  offers 
opportunities for security service providers to be responsive to secure digital ecosystem 
but it must also challenge them to ensure that such opportunities are taken to reflect the 
need of embedding fundamental values in innovative security services and products. This 
mainly happens under Research and Development (R&D) initiatives of these companies 
to address real-world cyber-security threats and scenarios in addition ensure trust  and 
confidence among their clients. Hence, security service providers must continue to build 
and protect  their  clients,  their  user  machines,  engage different  stakeholders  including 
businesses and customers to reflect their technical, political, social and ethical values and 
concerns,  and  respect  functional  values  upon  which  our  society  was  built  on  e.g. 
autonomy, equality, fairness, freedom and responsibility (Van den Hoven, 2008). They 
should then not only focus on the security vs. privacy dichotomy, but also highlight any 
other linkages between the core value of security in cybersecurity to other social and 
ethical values in order to understand the ethical problems of cybersecurity. To fulfill so, 
they need to address pro-actively future threats that come with the emergence of the next 
generations of technologies and services (e.g. IoT, 5G, etc.). But how can we make sure 
the R&D of security service providers today will meet the needs and requirements of 
tomorrow? How can we make sure relevant social and ethical values will be incorporated 
into the security service providers’ R&D? The discussed issues are solved when security 
service providers understand their security initiatives consequences. 
Some  security  service  providers  may  detect  an  intrusion  attempt  through  their 
independent security labs. The question is how aggressively they should block and stop 
an  intrusion  attempt.  In  most  cases,  a  trade-off  is  seen  as  they could  block a  bit  or 
aggressively in contrast. From a customer point of view, the rate of detection over the 
collection of  files could be against  the positive rate.  Security vendors have then two 
choices:  either  apply  for  high  intrusion  detection  rate  or  apply  high  positive  rate. 
Choosing either of those choices has economic implications for customers, and has an 
impact on their fairness levels. In addition, cybersecurity operators (such as ICT security 
software providers) have considerable access power to the computer  systems of their 
customers, which involves privacy risks, including the possibility of wrongly accusing an 
employer of the customer to be responsible for a certain cyber threat.  The right split  
between the rate of detection and the positive rate is absolutely a subjective issue and 
depends on the specific context. For instance, a military environment comparing a health 
sector environment might ask a higher positive rate instead of only detecting data, and as 
this request fulfills by security service providers, one can argue different fairness level 
within different cyber space environments.
Another example is, when security vendors collect data from user machines, where they 
need to have user consent for different activities. In fact, security service providers ask 
their  clients  to  fill  out  the consent  forms and clients  literally accept  relevant  consent 
forms. The question here is to what extent security service providers need to give their 
clients access to systems. Here is a value conflict between security measures and their 
impacts on customer’ access. More control from customers cause less control by security 
service  providers,  in  turn  revealing  more  sensitive  information.  Hence,  the  level  of 
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customer’  access  to  user  machines  and  digital  infrastructure,  which  can  involve 
discrimination (Custers, Calders, Schermer, & Zarsky, 2013), is twined to the security 
level. Hence, this value conflict between security and discrimination also must be taken 
into account within security service providers’ R&D.
Accordingly, security service providers’ R&D must also address social and ethical values 
rather only security while they take appropriate security measures. This is essential for 
the  maintenance  of  critical  societal  or  economic  activities  in  different  sectors  (e.g., 
energy, transport, banking, financial services, health, and digital infrastructure). 
Mapping and evaluating value conflicts in cybersecurity
However, how can cybersecurity service providers get a reasonable understating on the 
values involved in cybersecurity problems? Our suggestion is to provide a map on how 
key  aspects  of  cybersecurity  activities  positively  or  negatively  affects  those  values. 
Figure 4 shows a first draft of such a map based on values discussed in the previous 
sections. The map shows that cybersecurity is directly related to harm prevention values
—both information harm (e.g.,  caused through disclosure of  personal  information)  or 
physical harm (e.g., preventing damage on the critical infrastructure). Harm-prevention is 
supporting  for  a  set  of  other  important  values  such  as  privacy or  personal  freedom. 
However,  cybersecurity  measures  usually  involve  some  degree  of  monitoring,  cause 
economic  costs  and  require  personal  efforts.  Those  elements  usually  have  negative 
impact on a whole set of values: Economic costs raise problems of resource allocation 
that can be in conflict with notions of social justice of equality. Personal efforts needed is 
confronted  with  the  problem  that  individuals  differ  with  respect  on  possessing  the 
necessary  (e.g.,  cognitive)  resources.  Surveillance  not  only  increases  the  risk  of 
discrimination and privacy violation; false negative results also can directly impact a core 
value cybersecurity usually upholds, namely preventing information harm (e.g., because 
the  accused  employee  loses  reputation).  The  problem  is  further  complicated  by  the 
possibility that some values may be in a conflicting relation as well. Personal freedom 
can counteract social  justice,  requiring some kind of balancing—exemplified by John 
Stuart Mills famous quite in On Liberty: “The only freedom which deserves the name, is 
that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive 
others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”
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Figure 4: Outlining a first draft of a map on value conflicts in cybersecurity. Arrows with continuous lines 
show positive (i.e., supporting) relations, whereas arrows with dotted lines show conflicting relations (the 
map does not show all possible relations). Orange squares refer to values.
So, how can a map help to mitigate these conflicts? For doing this, it is important to 
recognize that the context strongly influences the framing of those value conflicts. By 
“context”,  we  do  not  refer  to  the  details  of  each  single  case,  but  to  the  notion  of 
“contextual  integrity”,  that  emphasizes  the  importance  of  distinct  social  spheres  and 
context sensitive norms in data flows (Nissenbaum, 2004). Contextual integrity forms a 
main moral reason for data protection (Van den Hoven, 2008); it is legally expressed in 
terms  of  purpose  specification,  use  limitation,  and  data  minimization.  Contextual 
integrity refers to the fact that the human environment is structured in social spheres that 
provide  important  reference  points  for  human  beings.  Humans  expect  to  be  treated 
differently in a family context compared to, for example, in a governmental organization. 
They accept inequality in treatment in the economic sphere that they would not accept in 
the health, legal or education sphere. Thus, the interpretation of moral values such as 
justice or autonomy, and the rules related to these values—for example in the case of 
justice  different  allocation  rules  such  as  “an  equal  share  for  everyone”  compared  to 
“sharing ac-cording to needs”—differ along these social spheres. The analysis of value 
conflicts in cybersecurity will have to consider such context effects.
The following example might be useful for explaining the role of contextual integrity. Let 
us assume that a cybersecurity service provider has considerable access to a computer 
network of a customer for allowing intrusion detection. In performing its monitoring task, 
the  cybersecurity  provider  detects  suspicious  activities  within  the  company computer 
network that might indicate that some employees of the company are actually involved in 
offensive cyberattacks against some other target, i.e., the company is not a victim of an 
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external intrusion, but acts as an attacker towards third parties. What is the status of this 
information  with  respect  to  contextual  integrity?  At  first  sight,  we are  in  a  business 
context with a contractual obligation between the customer and the provider. Disclosing 
this information towards the customer is thus an obligation. The fact that employees of 
the companies themselves act as attackers, however, have implications that go beyond the 
business domain. One possibility is that the employer acts on behalf of the company in 
order to disturb the activities of a foreign company that practices industrial espionage. 
This  “hacking  back”  would  follow  the  conception  of  “self-defense”  that  might  also 
morally justify offensive actions, but its legality is questionable (Lin, Allhoff, & Abney, 
2014). The other possibility is that the employee acts on his own, e.g. he tries to hack into 
a governmental website of an oppressive state as a form of hacktivism. This is surely 
illegal with respect to the internal rules of the company, but let us assume that the person 
emigrated from this oppressive country and that some of his family still lives there. If the 
information about this hacking activity leaves the business context, the ethical problems 
aggravate. In the first case, by approaching jurisdiction, the case likely becomes public—
and a company that has a reputation of hacking back is likely to become an even more 
likely target, thus increasing the cybersecurity problem17. In the second case, a risk of 
actual physical harm to third parties (the family of the offender) is risked. Thus, in either 
case,  the  ethical  solution  might  be  that  this  sensible  information  does  not  leave  the 
business  context.  In  the  first  case,  the  company  could  be  informed  by  the  security 
provider  about  the substantial  risks  “hacking back”  actually involves,  whereas  in  the 
second  case,  the  employee  could  be  internally  sanctioned  for  his  behavior  without 
disclosing the reason. This example illustrates that getting an understanding on how the 
changing context influences the ethical valence of information is important to understand 
value conflicts in cybersecurity.
Conclusion
In  this  contribution,  we  first  demonstrated  an  (expected)  growing  importance  of 
cybersecurity in general (measured by the number of publications) and an escalation in 
terms of describing the severity of the incidences (as increasingly war-like nowadays). 
We also found that the terminology of privacy still is the dominating ethical term in the  
debate,  although there are  indications  that  this  is  changing.  By referring to exemplar 
cases, we found that—although cybersecurity has an ethical justification in terms of harm 
prevention—cybersecurity activities can induce conflicts with other values, some even 
counteracting the ethical legitimation of cybersecurity as such.
This work, however, should be seen as a preliminary result. First, because the quantitative 
analysis has pointed to some conflicting results that need further investigations—which is 
not easy given that the literature body is huge. Second, because the examples provided 
deserve a deeper normative analysis as done so far. Our draft of a value map requires 
more refinement. Furthermore, it should include a more intuitive way of visualizing the 
contextual aspects of possible conflicts. For doing this, we consider the framework of 
17 See: https://business.kaspersky.com/hacking-back-ii/4556/ - Accessed 02/02/2014
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contextual integrity as fruitful. However, more work is needed in order to explore this 
approach. 
Acknowledgement
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation programme under grant agreement No. 700540 and the Swiss State Secretariat 
for Education, Research and Innovation under contract number 16.0052-1.
References
Brey, P. (2007). Ethical Aspects of Information Security and Privacy. In M. J. Carey & S. 
Ceri (Eds.), Security, Privacy and Trust in Modern Data Management (pp. 21–36). 
Heidel-berg: Springer.
Carroll, A. B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral 
management of organizational stakeholders. Business Horizons, 34(14), 39–48.
CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2014). Net Losses: Estimating the 
Global Cost of Cybercrime Economic impact of cybercrime II. Retrieved January 
31, 2017, from http://www.mcafee.com/mx/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-
cybercrime2.pdf
Custers, H. M., Calders, T., Schermer, B. W., & Zarsky, T. Z. (2013). Discrimination and 
Privacy in the Information Society Berlin/London: Springer. In Studies in Applied 
Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (Vol. 3). Berlin/London: Springer.
Egelman, S., Herley, C., & van Oorschot, P. C. (2013). Markets for zero-day exploits: 
ethics and implications (pp. 41–46). ACM Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2535813.2535818
ORBIT Journal DOI: 16
Elkington, J. (1997). Cannibals with Forks. The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century  
Business. Mankato: Capston Publishing Ltd.
Fox, D. (2010). Elektronische Gesundheitskarte. Datenschutz Und Datensicherheit –  
DuD, 34(12), 844.
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Stakeholder management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pit-
man.
Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The 
New York Times Magazine, 13, 122–126.
Friedman, M. (1982). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press.
Garvie, C., Bedoya, A. M., & Frankle, J. (2016). The perpetual line-up. Unregulated  
police face recognition in America. Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & 
Technology.
Introna, L., & Wood, D. (2004). Picturing algorithmic surveillance: the politics of facial 
recognition systems. Surveillance and Society, 2(2/3), 177–198.
International Telecommunications Union. (2008). ITU-TX.1205: series X: data net-
works, open system communications and security: telecommunication security: 
overview of cybersecurity. Retrieved January 31, 2017, from 
https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1205-200804-I
Jürjens, J., & Rumm, R. (2008). Model-based Security Analysis of the German Health 
Card Architecture. Methods of Information in Medicine, 47(5), 409–421.
ORBIT Journal DOI: 17
Klare, B. F., Burge, M. J., Klontz, J. C., Vorder Bruegge, R. W., & Jain, A. K. (2012). 
Face Recognition Performance: Role of Demographic Information. IEEE 
Transactions on In-Formation Forensics and Security, 7(6), 1789–1801.
Klimburg, A. (Ed.). (2012). National cyber security framework manual. NATO CCD 
COE Publications.
Laur, A. (2015). Fear of e-Health Records implementation? Medico-Legal Journal, 83(1), 
34–39.
Lin, P., Allhoff, F., & Abney, K. (2014). Is Warfare the Right Frame for the Cyber 
Debate? In L. Floridi & M. Taddeo (Eds.), The Ethics of Information Warfare (pp. 
39–59). Berlin: Springer.
Nissenbaum, H. (2004). Privacy as contextual integrity. Washington Law Review, 79, 
119–157.
Pike, R. E. (2013). The “Ethics” of Teaching Ethical Hacking. Journal of International  
Technology and Information Management, 22(4), 1–7.
Rowe, N. C. (2008). Ethics of Cyber War Attacks. In L. Janczewski & A. Colarik (Eds.), 
Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism (pp. 384–394). Hersey: Information Science 
Reference.
Sunyaev, A., Leimeister, J. M., & Krcmar, H. (2010). Open Security Issues in German 
Healthcare Telematics (pp. 87–194). Presented at the Proceedings of the Third 
International Conference on Health Informatics (HealthInf 2010), Valencia/Spain.
ORBIT Journal DOI: 18
Van den Hoven, J. (2008). Information technology, privacy, and the protection of personal 
data. In J. van den Hoven & J. Weckert (Eds.), Information technology and moral  
philosophy (pp. 301–321). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Winandy, M. (2010). A Note on the Security in the Card Management System of the 
German E-Health Card. In Electronic Healthcare—Third International Conference 
(pp. 193–203). Casablanca/Morocco.
Wirtz, B. W., Mory, L., & Ullrich, S. (2012). eHealth in the public sector: An empirical 
anal-ysis of the acceptance of Germany’s electronic health card. Public  
Administration, 90(3), 642–663.
World Commission. (1987). Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development: Our Common Future, Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable Development. 
Retrieved from http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf
ORBIT Journal DOI: 19
